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Summary and Conclusions
Empirical Findings
HOLDINGS OF AMERICAN LIQUID DOLLAR ASSETS
Foreign nonofficial nonbank holdings of American liquid dollar
assets have been relatively stable in recent years; they have varied
by less than $1 billion between the end of 1965 and mid-1972 and
have exhibited no upward trend over the period.U.S. demand
deposit holdings of this group have shown little change, at least
since the end of .1963. Given the fact that international trade valued
in current dollars has more than doubled since then, the stability of
these dollar holdings suggests that foreign nonbanks have found
ways of economizing on their dollar balance requirements for both
transactions and precautionary purposes.It also indicates that, in
view of the several-fold increase in foreign nonbank holdings of
other international liquid assets, American dollar balances have
become relatively less remunerative or perhaps less desired for other
reasons.It should be pointed out that these trends were evident
well before 1970 while the dollar was strong in the foreign ex-
change market.
The behavior of American liquid dollar balances of foreign com-
mercial b.anks is obscured by the data. We have only a rough
breakdown between those balances that constitute intra-multi-
national bank accounting entries and other balances, and the latter
are not fully disaggregated by category of liquid dollar asset, e.g.,
demand deposits. From the end of 1966 to the end of 1970, 68
to 76 percent of all reported U.S. liquid liabilities to foreign com-
mercial banks constituted intra-multinational bank balances. Dur-
ing each of these years except 1970, the largest amount was ac-
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counted for by the liabilities of U.S. banks to their foreign branches,
which rose from $4.0 billion at the end of 1966 to a high of $14.5
billion at the end of November 1969 and then dropped to $6.2 bil-
lion by the end of 1970 and to only $1.3 billion by the end of 1971.
These balances arose out of U.S. commercial bank borrowings from
the Eurodollar market through their foreign branches and were, for
the most part, not related to the financing of international transac-
tions. The dollar liabilities of the U.S. branches and agencies of
foreign banks to their head offices and affiliates abroad showed a
fairly steady growth from $3.3 billion at the end of 1964 to $6.0
billion at the end of 1970. Thereafter they dropped to $4.5 billion
by the end of 1971. These liabilities constitute in large measure a
commitment of foreign commercial banks to banking operations in
the United States concerned with both U.S. domestic and inter-
national finance.Given the circumstances under which the large
volume of intra-multinational bank balances was created, it is im-
possible to determine either the amounts of foreign liquid dollar
balances which serve an international transactions function or the
amounts which represent the American dollar asset components of
the liquid interest-earning portfolios of foreign commercial banks.
As long as the rise in foreign liquid claims on the United States
was largely in the form of intra-multinational bank balances, the
holdings of foreign official institutions were fairly stable, the net
increase being only $0.2 billion from the end of 1964 to the end
of 1969. Then, with the decline in intra-multinational bank bal-
ances, foreign official claims rose rapidly. The bulk of the increase
in these claims in 1970 ($7.7 billion) could be accounted for by
the fall in claims of foreign branches of U.S. banks on their parents
($6.4 billion). In 1971, however, foreign official holdings of Amer-
ican dollars soared by $26.9 billion, of which no more than $5 bil-
lion could be attributed to the further liquidation of commer-
cial bank liabilities to the Eurodollar market. That increase brought
total liquid claims on the United States by foreign official institutions
at the end of 1971. to just over $50 billion, or more than twice the.
amount a year earlier and more than three times that of two years
earlier.
In contrast to foreign liquid claims on the United States, theEmpirical Findings 87
(recorded) volume of U.S. liquid claims on foreigners has not in-
creased substantially since 1964. It was, in fact, slightly higher at
the end of 1968 ($10.9 billion) than at the 'end of 1971 ($10.8
billion). The U.S. net liquid position vis-à-vis each of the three
categories of foreign liquid dollar asset holders behaved quite dif-
ferently over the 1964—71 period. The U.S. net (negative) liquid
position with foreign nonbanks remained within a range of from
$3.2 to $4.8 billion over the period 1963—71 and was $3.8 billion
at the end of 1971. However, the U.S. short-term position with
foreign nonbanks was positive throughout the period, taking into
account not only liquid items but also U.S. short-term loans and
credits to foreigners.(In addition, U.S. corporations had large
claims on their foreign affiliates which are generally not included
in the data on short-term indebtedness.) The U.S. net (negative)
liquid position with foreign commercial banks (including foreign
branches of U.S. banks) rose from $1.1 billion at the end of 1964
to $16.4 billion by the end of 1969, but declined to $1.4 billion by
the end of 1971. The recorded positions, however, grossly under-
state U.S. resident claims on foreign commercial banks. The United
States probably had a net positive position vis-à-vis foreign commer-
cial banks at the end of 1971 if the several billion dollars in (largely
unreported) U.S. resident holdings of Eurodollar deposits are in-
cluded. Thus at the end of 1971, of the three categories distin-
guished, the United States had a net negative short-term position
only with foreign official institutions of approximately $50 billion.
HOLDINGS OF EURODOLLARS
Since Eurodollar deposits perform many of the same functions as
American dollars, we have estimated the volume of foreign holdings
of Eurodollars again by nonofficial nonbanks, commercial banks,
and official institutions. Because of the data limitations, the Euro-
dollar balances of foreign nonofficial nonbanks have been limited
to their Eurodollar holdings with "inside area" and Canadian banks.
On this basis foreign nonbank deposits rose from $7.0 billion at
the end of 1966 to $17.6 billion by the end of 1970, but fell to
$14.5 billion by the end of 1971. Foreign nonbank borrowings of
Eurodollars rose throughout the same period from $5.8 billion at88 Summary and Conclusions
the end of 1966 to $24.8 billion by the end of .1971. The largest
increase occurred during 1970, the period of largest repayments of
U.S. commercial to the Eurodollar market.
Gross Eurodollar holdings of foreign commercial banks include
some $40 to $50 billion of interbank balances of "inside area"
banks and of other foreign commercial banks and foreign branches
of U.S. banks active in the market. (Banks are regarded as active
in the Eurodollar market if they engage in mutual depositing with
one another as contrasted with banks that may simply borrow funds
from the market or deposit funds in the market in much the same
way as nonbanks.) The BIS excludes all interbank dollar balances
of "inside area" banks in its calculation of the net size of the Euro-
dollar market on the same grounds that interbank balances are ex-
cluded in 'the calculation of domestic money supply in national
economies. In our conceptual framework of the Eurodollar market,
we regard all foreign commercial banks that are active in the market
in the sense indicated above, plus foreign branches of U.S. banks,
as constituting the Eurodollar interbank system. However, we re-
gard the foreign branches of U.S. banks as playing a dual role. They
are part of both the U.S. banking system and the Eurodollar inter-
bank system. In estimating the Eurodollar deposits of foreign com-
mercial banks in the Eurodollar banking system, we exclude all
deposits of these banks with one another. However, we include in
our estimates of Eurodollar deposits of foreign commercial banks
their net deposits with foreign branches of U.S. banks. There are,
in addition, a large number of foreign commercial banks outside
the Eurodollar banking system that have deposits with foreign com-
mercial banks which form a part of the system. Unfortunately, since
there is no way by which the volume of these deposits can be derived
from the available data, they are excluded from our estimate of
Eurodollar deposits of foreign commercial banks. The net position
of all foreign commercial banks with foreign branches of U.S. banks
rose from $2.2 billion at the end of 1966 to $9.7 billion by the end
of 1969. The net position declined to $4.0 billion by the end of
1971 with the repayment of U.S. commercial boirowings to the
Eurodollar market. .
Foreignofficial holdings of Eurodollar deposits have become in-
creasingly important in recent years with identified deposits risingEmpirical Findings 89
from an estimated $1.3 billion at the end of 1964 to $10.1 billion
by the end of 1971. Moreover; a portion of the $8.7 billion in
unidentified official holdings of Eurocurrencies and other reserve
assets are believed to represent Eurodollar deposits.
COMBINED HOLDINGS AND NET POSITIONS
On the basis of the definitions of liquid dollar holdings given
above, we have calculated the combined American liquid dollar and
Eurodollar holdings of the three categories of foreign dollar holders.
Total combined liquid dollar holdings rose from $36.4 billion at
the end of 1966 (of which $25.2 billion were American liquid dol-
lars), to $93.5 billion by the end of 1971 (of which $64.9 billion
were American liquid dollars). Almost half of the combined for-
eign liquid dollar holdings at the end of 1966 and almost two-thirds
at the end of 1971 represented the claims of foreign official institu-
tions on U.S. residents. The combined liquid dollar holdings of
foreign commercial banks rose from $8.2 billion at the end of 1966
to a high of $20.9 billion by the end of 1969, and declined to $14.0
billion by the end of 1971. At the end of 1969, 46 percent of for-
eign commercial bank holdings of liquid dollar assets consisted of
net deposits with foreign branches of U.S. banks as contrasted with
29 percent at the end of 1971. The combined liquid dollar holdings
of foreign nonbanks rose from $11.3 billion at the end of 1966 to
a high of $22.3 billion by the end of to $18.7 bil-
lion by the end of 1971. The variations in these holdings were due
almost entirely to changes in their holdings of Eurodollars since for-
eign nonbank holdings of American dollar assets remained rela-
tively stable throughout the period.Over the period 1969—71,
Eurodollars represented nearly 80 percent of the total liquid dollar
holdings of foreign nonbanks as contrasted with slightly over 60
percent at the end of 1966.
Over the 1966—68 period, the net Eurodollar positions of foreign
nonbanks were in approximate balance. With the rapid rise in their
Eurodollar deposits in '1969, their net position shifted to a credit
balance of $6.3 billion by the end of that year. During 1970, for-
eign nonbank Eurodollar deposits leveled Off, and in 1971 they de-
clined sharply. Eurodollar loans to foreign nonbanks nearly dou-
bled in 1970 and continued to rise during 1971. Consequently the90 Summary and Conclusions
net Eurodollar position of foreign nonbanks turned negative in
1970; the negative position increased to $10.3 billion by the end
of 1971.Since the net positive position of foreign nonbanks in
.American liquid dollar assets remained within a range of from
$3.8 to $4.8 billion over the 1966—71 period, the net combined
liquid dollar position of foreign nonbanks shifted from a net posi-
tive position of $10.6 billion at the end of 1969 to a negative posi-
tion of about $6.5 billion by the end of 1971
Adequate data for determining the net Eurodollar positions of
foreign commercial banks (excluding foreign branches of U.S.
banks) are not available, but it seems unlikely that foreign com-
mercial banks had a substantial uncovered positive dollar position
in 1970 or 1971. On the other hand, foreign official institutions
quite clearly had net credit positions in both Eurodollars and Amer-
ican dollars throughout the 1966—71 period. Although some for-
eign nonbanks undoubtedly incurred losses in terms of their own
currencies at the time of the currency realignment in December
1971, most of them probably gained. The vast bulk of the losses
from the depreciation of the dollar in 1971 were absorbed by the
foreign central banks.1
SUBSTITUTION AMONG HOLDINGS OF DIFFERENT ASSETS
While American liquid dollar assets and Eurodollar deposits
would seem to be close substitutes for one another, differentials be-
tween U.S. money market rates and Eurodollar deposit rates have
at times exceeded 200 basis points. Changes in deposits of U.S.
residents in the Eurodollar market are probably sensitive to changes
in the U.S. money market—Eurodollar deposit rate differential, but
there are simply no satisfactory data on holdings of Eurodollar
deposits by U.S. residents with which to test this relationship. Our
investigation of the interest sensitivity of foreign nonbanks with
respect to shifts in their portfolios between interest-earning Ameri-
can liquid dollar assets and Eurodollar deposits failed to yield
positive results. On a month-to-month basis for the period June
1968—December 1971, changes in the composition of liquid dollar
1. Foreign central banks provided much of the cover for the positive dollar
positions of foreign commercial banks through swap operations in dollars and by
supporting the forward rate on the dollar.Empirical Findings 91
assets of foreign nonbanks did not occur in accordance with
changes in the spread between the Eurodollar deposit rate and the
U.S. secondary market rate for CDs. In 42 observations recorded
in Table 2.10, the movements were in accordance with a priori
expectations in only 10 cases.Nevertheless, better data and the
inclusion of other liquid assets in the portfolios of foreign nonbanks,
together with allowance for lags in response to changes in interest
rate differentials and for changes in expectations regarding future
movements in exchange rates, might well have revealed the existence
of interest sensitivity. We did find indirect evidence over the period
from the end of 1968 to the end of 1970 of substitution of foreign
nonbank holdings of Eurodollars for their holdings of liquid Ameri-
can dollars. But this substitution is probably long run or structural
rather than short run, that is, m'onth-to-month or quarter-to-quarter.
Our indirect evidence of substitution is derived from the fact that
during the 1968—70 period the secular growth in foreign nonbank
holdings of American liquid assets was interrupted by a decline in
such holdings. During this same period foreign nonbank holdings
of Eurodollar deposits had their most rapid growth. They rose by
an amount nearly twice the total volume of American liquid dollar
•holdings of foreign nonbanks.
Given the sharp rise after 1968 in foreign nonbank holdings of
Eurodollars—all out of proportion to the historical rate of growth
of their holdings of U.S. liquid dollar assets—it appears likely that
most of this increase represented a substitution of Eurodollars for
nondollar currencies. There have been large differentials in yields
between Eurodollar deposits and European domestic currency de-
posits with the same maturity, ranging up to 300 basis points or
more on both a covered and an uncovered basis.In most cases,
these differentials have been in favor of Eurodollar deposits. While
we lack adequate data for formulating and testing a portfolio-ad-
justment model for foreign nonbank holdings of Eurodollar depos-
its, our regression analysis did confirm the existence of significant
relationships between changes in foreign nonbank deposits in all
foreign branches of U.S. banks and in U.K. branches alone, on the
one hand, and in differentials between covered Eurodollar
deposit rates and British and Swiss deposit rates, respectively, on the
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There is also statistical evidence that Eurodollar banks in Be!-
gium, the Netherlands, France, and Germany over the period Sep-
tember 1963—June 1969 tended to be net lenders to the Eurodollar
market when the interbank Eurodollar rate exceeded the domestic
money market rate and to be net borrowers from the Eurodollar
market when the domestic money market. rate exceeded the Euro-
dollar rate.
EURODOLLAR MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL PAYMENTS
The operations of the Eurodollar market have a direct impact on
the U.S. balance of payments only when U.S. residents are involved
as net lenders or borrowers from the market. Thus during periods
of large U.S. resident borrowings from the market, the U.S. official
transactions balance tended to improve. This balance was adversely
affected in periods of net U.S. resident repayments to the market.
A priori analysis suggests that the growth of the Eurodollar market
has had a beneficial effect on the U.S. basic balance, but sufficient
information is not available to confirm this conclusion.
The growth of the Eurodollar market does not depend upon U.S.
balance-of-payments deficits. However, to the extent that U.S. defi-
cits increase world liquidity, foreigners have a larger volume of
funds for placement in the market. Foreign official institutions have
been an important source of funds for the Eurodollar market.. As
U.S. deficits increased the dollar reserves of foreign central banks,
these institutions have been induced by the higher yields on Euro-
dollar deposits (and by other factors as well) to acquire Eurodollar
deposits.Recently, several European surplus countries have im-
posed restrictions on capital imports, including the establishment of
reserves on deposit liabilities to foreigners by their commercial
banks and cash deposit requirements for direct borrowing by domes-
tic nonbank corporations from the Eurocurrency markets. These
actions have tended to limit the demand for Eurodollar loans in the
countries employing the restrictions. The Eurodollar market and
other Eurocurrency markets, however, have continued to grow,
partly as a consequence of the increased demand for Eurocurrency
loans from the developing countries and Eastern Europe.The International Role of the Dollar 93
The International Role of the Dollar
The summary of our empirical findings provides certain insights
regarding the changes in the international role of the dollar over the
1964—71 period. Foreign private holdings of American liquid dol-
lar balances have grown only modestly when compared with the
nearly twofold increase in the value of world trade and perhaps a
several-fold increase in the volume of international financial
actions. Foreign nonbank holdings of American liquid dollar assets
have declined since 1968. They are little higher than they were at
the end of 1964; their holdings of U.S. demand deposits rose by
only 13 percent between 1963 and 1971. Recorded holdings of
American liquid dollar assets by foreign commercial banks (exclud-
ing foreign branches of U.S. banks) rose from $6.1 billion at the
end of 1964 to $10.0 billion by the end of 1971 (Table 2.2, line
3), but of the latter amount $4.5 billion represented liabilities of
U.S. agencies and branches of foreign banks to their head offices
abroad, not all of which can properly be regarded as performing
the functions of an international currency.
This relatively modest growth in foreign private holdings of
American dollars appears to reflect two developments. First, for-
eigners have economized on dollar holdings which perform the
functions of transactions and precautionary balances. This economy
has been achieved in part through the operations of multinational
banking institutions.Second, the function of the dollar as a me-
dium of foreign private holdings of liquid interest-earning assets has
in large measure been shifted to the Eurodollar market or, more
broadly, to the Eurocurrency marlet.Nevertheless, we do not
believe that these developments imply a diminution of the inter-
national currency functions of the dollar. They do imply a shift
in the international financial intermediation function from U.S.
financial markets to worldwide markets, a shift that occurred in
part as a consequence of U.S. monetary policies, including capital
export controls, and in part as a consequence of the worldwide ex-
pansion of the U.S. banking system. These two causal forces were
not unrelated, of course, inasmuch as the foreign expansion of U.S.94 Summary and Conclusions
banks was greatly stimulated by U.S. monetary policies and controls.
Our data also provide certain insights into the demand for Amer-
ican dollar holdings by foreign official institutions. At the end of
1964 such holdings totaled $15.8 billion, rising to $18.2 billion by
the end of 1967. By the end of June 1969, however, they had fallen
to $14.9 billion, mainly as a consequence of the large U.S. commer-
cial bank borrowings from the Eurodollar market. In spite of the
fact that European central bankers had been complaining about
having to absorb more dollars than they wanted to hold in their
reserves, in mid-1969, foreign governments complained about the
drain on their dollar reserves caused by the U.S. commercial bank
borrowings from the Eurodollar market,2 and in the second half of
1969 some countries, including Germany, sold gold to the U.S.
Treasury in order to rebuild their dollar reserves.This strongly
suggests that, at least until the end of 1969, foreign central bank
holdings of dollars were roughly in line with their voluntary demand
for them. After 1969 much of the rise in foreign central bank hold-
ings of dollars constituted an involuntary acquisition on the part of
the major surplus countries of Europe and Japan.
REASONS FOR THE GROWTH OF EURODOLLARS
Although a portion of the rise in foreign private holdings of Euro-
dollars may be regarded as a substitute for dollar balances which
might otherwise have been held in the United States, the vast bulk
of the rise in these Eurodollar claims must be explained by factors
relating to the growth of the Eurocurrency market itself. We may,
therefore, ask whether the several-fold rise in Eurodollar deposits
should be regarded as a rise in the demand for dollar liquidity as
such or whether this rise reflected an increase in the world demand
for international liquidity in general.
Over the period 1964—71, the world demand for liquid assets
expanded very rapidly. In many developed countries the volume of
2. In mid-1969 when U.S. resident borrowings from the Eurodollar market
substantially exceeded the U.S. dollars provided by the deficit on the U.S. basic
transactions account, foreign central bankers (at the meetings of the Group of
Ten) requested the United States to take action to limit U.S. bank borrowings
from the market through their foreign branches.In response to this request the
Federal Reserve Board established a 10 percent reserve requirement on U.S. bank
borrowings through their branches beyond a specified base level.The International Role of the Dollar 95
quasi-money (time and savings accounts in commercial banks and
other savings institutions) has risen proportionately more than the
rise in GNP.R Moreover, an increasing proportion of liquid asset
holdings of private nonbanking concerns and individuals appears
to have taken the form of international assets. A partial indication
of the rise in the volume of liquid international asset holdings is
provided by the BIS data on "inside area" bank liabilities to (non-
resident) nonbanking concerns and individuals. Over the period
December 1966—December 1971, these liabilities rose from $4.6
billion to $12.8 biffion.4 This estimate does not include the rise of
several billion dollars in foreign currency deposits held by residents
of "inside area" countries with commercial banks located in their
own countries.Portfolio theory offers an explanation of the ex-
pansion of demand for international assets in terms of risk diversifi-
cation and the desire for higher yields on assets with equivalent ma-
turities and risk exposure. But whatever the factors underlying the
demand, the supply of international liquid assets for satisfying the
preferences of portfolio holders has been provided in large measure
by the development of the Eurocurrency market.
It is our view that the growth of the Eurodollar market cannot
be explained in terms of either the foreign demand for dollar li-
quidity as such or the international liquidity requirements for an
expanded international trade. Since 1964, international liquid asset
holdings have increased out of all proportion to the rise in inter-
national trade. The growth of the Eurocurrency market took place
in response to the increase in the world demand for diversified
international liquid assets. Liquid asset holders were able to hold
their assets in any one of a dozen countries with approximately the
same yield for the same maturity. Thus, even though most of these
liquid assets were denominated in dollars, the political risks were
diversified while the exchange risks could be hedged in the forward
market.
3. For example, in Germany time and savings deposits rose by nearly 190 per-
cent over the period between the end of 1964 and the end of 1971; increasing by
130 percent in Switzerland; and by nearly fourfold in France.In none of these
countries did GNP in current prices double during the period.(See Country
Pages in IMF, International Financial Statistics, December 1971 and December
1972.)
4. BIS data include liabilities in both dollar and nondollar currencies.BIS,
Forty-Second Annual Report, Basle, June 1972, p. 151.96 Summary and Conclusions
THE ROLE OF THE DOLLAR IN THE EUROCURRENCY MARKET
We have noted that the Eurocurrency market has served as a
very efficient international financial intermediary. First, it provides
the lenders with a variety of highly liquid assets (diversified on a
geographical basis) on which their covered returns are generally
higher than returns available in domestic money markets, and it
provides borrowers with a dependable source of loan funds with a
variety of maturities and at a cost frequently lower than the cost of
loans from domestic money markets.Second, the Eurocurrency
market together with the Eurobond market, which have in consid-
erable measure replaced the international intermediation functions
of U.S. resident institutions, have certain advantages over U.S. resi-
dent institutions for both lenders and borrowers. Lenders can deal
through their own resident banks and investment houses or through
financial institutions in a number of other countries, thereby diversi-
fying their risks. Borrowers can also deal with financial institutions
• in their own countries or with those in other countries. Third, both
the Eurocurrency and the Eurobond markets are, to some degree
at least, independent of monetary developments in the United
States.5Nevertheless, the advantages of a worldwide system of
international financial intermediation have in large measure been
provided by an extension of the U.S. commercial banking and in-
vestment banking systems to the major countries of the world, work-
ing in cooperation with the financial institutions of other countries.
But why has the U.S. dollar rather than other major currencies
served as the principal currency in which Eurocurrency transactions
have been denominated? 6Theanswer is to be found in the charac-
teristics of the dollar itself and in the institutional framework of the
Eurocurrency market. Prior to 1970 there was little expectation of
S. Assuming a continuation of reserve requirements on borrowings by U.S.
banks from their foreign branches imposed by the Federal Reserve Board in June
1969 (together with subsequent Federal Reserve actions to discourage such bor-
rowing), it appears unlikely that the heavy borrowing by U.S. banks from the
Eurodollar market that took place in 1966, 1968, and 1969 will be repeated.
6. Nonbank holdings of nondollar Eurocurrency deposits were only about $0.5
billiondollars at the end of 1966, but they increased to $2.8 billion at the end of
1971 and they have continued to grow during 1972. See BIS, Forly-Second An-
nual Report, p. 151; and Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York, World
Financial Markets, September 19, 1971, p. 4.The International Role of the Dollar 97
either devaluation or appreciation of the U.S. dollaT vis-à-vis all
other currencies taken together at least in the short run. 'Taking
both Eurocurrency lenders and borrowers together, this made the
dollar the optimal medium for international financial intermedia-
tion. No other currency had these characteristics of an international
standard.In addition, the foreign branches of U.S. banks, which
were largely responsible for the rapid growth of the Eurodollar mar-
ket in the 1960s, sought to attract dollar deposits to provide dollars
for their U.S. parents and to supply dollar loans to U.S. firms op-
erating abroad. Multinational firms with headquarters in the United
States were large depositors as well as borrowers, and they normally
preferred to hold dollars. A substantial proportion of the U.S. dol-
lars entering the Eurodollar market came from the central banks
either by means of central bank deposits or through swap transac-
tions with foreign commercial banks. The U.S. deficit on basic
transactions account served to provide both a source of foreign
liquidity and a source of dollars for the market during the period
prior to 1970 when a large proportion of the dollars deposited with
Eurodollar banks was being transferred to the United States.
Expectations of a dollar devaluation contributed to the growing
U.S. deficits on official reserve transactions account during 1970
and 1971 and evidently reduced the attractiveness of Eurodollar
deposits to foreign nonbank holders. Thus during 1970, foreign
nonbank holdings of Eurodollar deposits rose by less than $0.5
billion (see Table 2.5) while nonbank deposits in other Eurocur-
rencies rose by more than $1 billion.7During 1971, nondollar
Eurocurrency deposits of nonbanks continued to grow while Euro-
dollar deposits of foreign nonbanks declined.8 This decline in f or-
eign nonbank holdings of Eurodollar deposits was more than offset
by the growth of foreign central bank deposits, of U.S. resident
deposits, and of other sources of dollars available to the market
(see Tables 2.3 and 2.10).
The shift in the net Eurodollar positions of foreign nonbanks
7. B1S, Forty-Second Animal Report, p. 151. Nonbank Eurocurrency deposits
in nondollar currencies include both U.S. resident and foreign deposits, but we
have no way of separating them.
8. A part of the increase in the dollar value of nondollar Eurocurrency deposits
during 1971is attributable to the depreciation of the dollar in terms of other
European currencies.98 Summary and Conclusions
from a positive balance of over $6 billion at the end of 1969 toa
negative position of over $10 billion at the end of 1971 indicates
that foreign nonbanks converted nearly $17 billion into foreign cur-
rencies over the period. This conversion of dollars—largely bor-
rowed from the Eurodollar market—into foreign currencies ac-
counted for about half of the increase in American dollar holdings
of foreign official institutions over the same period. These holdings
played a decisive role in precipitating the "dollar crisis" of August
1971.
Since the end of 1971, the decline in foreign nonbank deposits
has been reversed. Between the end of December 1971 and the end
of October 1972, foreign nonbank deposits in foreign branches of
U.S. banks rose by about $1.4 billion. Deposits of foreign commer-
cial banks in foreign branches of U.S. banks rose by about $4.7
billion over the same period, and the volume of deposits of foreign
official institutions with foreign branches of U.S. banks rose also,
by more than $2 billion.9 Thus, despite the dollar crises of 1970—7 1,
the Eurodollar market continued to expand during 1972)0
THE FUTURE ROLE OF THE DOLLAR
In the light of the world currency developments since August
1971 and in the context of the current negotiations on international
monetary reform, two questions arise regarding the future role of
the dollar. One relates to the prospective growth of foreign dollar
balances in the United States. We have already witnessed retarda-
tion in the growth of foreign private holdings of American dollar
balances and the partial replacement of the functions of these bal-
anées by Eurodollars. We have also seen an erosion of the inter-
national financial intermediation function of the United States.
This function has in considerable measure been transferred abroad
by the growth of foreign branches of U.S. banks and of U.S. invest-
ment banking houses operating in the Eurobond market. In other
words, the world-banker functions of the United States have tended
to become internationalized in a manner analogous to the functions
9. FederalReserve Bulletin,March 1973, p. A89.
10. According to WorldFinancialMarkets(MorganGuaranty Trust Com-
pany of New York, March 22, 1973, p. 4), the net size of the Eurodollar com-
ponent of the Eurocurrency market grew by $15 billion during 1972.— w
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of U.S. nonfinancial corporations. Foreign banks have also pene-
trated the U.S. banking system, with the result that international
transactions are financed through multinational banks to an in-
creasing degree, and international borrowing and lending take place
in world markets rather than through bilateral transactions involv-
ing lenders and borrowers in different countries. It seems likely that
even with a return of international confidence in the exchange sta-
bility of the dollar, international liquidity holders will continue to
have a preference for Eurocurrency deposits American liquid
dollar assets and that the demand for Eurocurrency loans will con-
tinue to expand. Eurocurrency deposit rates are likely to continue
to be somewhat higher than U.S. money market rates, while U.S.
rates set a floor for Eurodollar deposit rates.Since U.S. capital
controls played an important role in the creation of both the Euro-
currency and the Eurobond markets, it has been suggested that if
these controls are phased out by the end of 1974, as Secretary Shultz
proposed in his statement of February 12, 1973,11internationalbor-
rowing will be shifted from both the Eurocurrency and Eurobond
markets to the United States.However, given the institutional
structure of the Eurodollar market, it appears likely that most for-
eign firms would find it easier and more convenient to borrow from
local Eurodollar banks where they are known rather than from U.S.
banks. Moreover, U.S. parent banks may prefer to make loans
through their foreign branches in much the same way that they
make loans through their domestic branches.
Although the efficiency of the Eurocurrency market and its pop-
ularity with both lenders and borrowers have been clearly demon-
strated, we noted in Chapter 3 that national governments have been
limiting their residents' use of the Eurocurrency market, and that
there has been considerable discussion regarding an international
agreement or concerted action by governments to constrain the op-
erations of that market. One example of a potential general con-
straint on the Eurocurrency market is an agreement on the part of
all governments to establish substantial reserve requirements on
Eurocurrency deposits.This would increase the cost to Eurocur-
11. See "Statement on Foreign Economic Policy," Secretary of the Treasury
George P. Shultz, Department of the Treasury News Release, February 12, 1973.100 Summaryand Conclusions
rency banks of obtaining funds from Eurocurrency deposits and
would tend to reduce the interest rates the banks could pay on these
deposits, or increase the rates they would have to charge on loans,
or both, thereby decreasing the advantages of the Eurocurrency
market as a financial intermediary.However, there are serious
obstacles to the elimination or substantial curtailment of the Euro-
currency market. As an international market, the Eurocurrency
market can operate anyplace in the world, beyond the jurisdiction
of the major financial powers.Recently, we have witnessed the
rapid expansion of Eurocurrency banking in such areas as the Ba-
hamas, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Beirut. From all over the world,
funds in large amounts can flow into the Eurocurrency market via
branches of multinational banks located outside the principal finan-
cial centers, and these branches can place funds through their affili-
ates in almost any country. Moreover, the major developed nations
are far from any agreement on the desirability of concerted action
to suppress the market.
A second question is whether we should expect Eurodollar de-
posits to be displaced in large measure by Euro-Deutsche marks,
Eurosterling, Euro-Swiss francs and other nondollar Eurocurrencies.
Are the factors discussed above explaining the past dominance of
the dollar in the Eurocurrency market likely to continue to prevail?
The first and most important factor concerns the future role of the
dollar as an international standard of value. On the one hand, this
standard-of-value role has been shaken by the formal devaluation'
of the dollar following the Smithsonian Accord of December 1971',
and by the further devaluation announced in February 1973. These
events showed that the exchange value of the dollar could be
changed simultaneously in relation to most of the world's leading
currencies—something that many economists had been denying.
Moreover, if the European Community (EC) joint float, initiated
in March 1973, proves successful and is expanded to include the
pound sterling, the exchange value of the dollar would fluctuate in
relation to a group of the world's leading currencies. There would
be two international standards of value fluctuating in relation to
one another, and the consequences for the role of the dollar in the
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if the EC float does not prove successful, and if international con-
fidence in the dollar is restored so that a further devaluation of the
dollar in terms of the SDR is not anticipated, the dollar would re-
main as the principal international standard of value. Even in an
international monetary regime in which none of the world's leading
currencies maintained a formal parity (or central rate) in terms of
the SDR or the dollar, the currencies of the rest of the world would
be floating in relation to the dollar.'2 Under these circumstances,
the dollar would remain as the major currency least likely to de-
preciate or appreciate simultaneously against all other currencies
and, hence, would continue to be the optimal medium for inter-
national financial intermediation for both Eurocurrency lenders and
borrowers.
A second factor making for the dominance of Eurodollars in the
Eurocurrency market in the past has been the leading role played
by U.S. banks in the Eurocurrency market in terms of both the
volume of business and the provision of institutional facilities.
While U.S. banks can and do trade in other Eurocurrencies, the
bulk of their assets and liabilities in both the United States and
abroad are in dollars, and a large part of their overseas business is
with U.S.-based multinational firms and traders that deal largely in
dollars.Hence, it seems likely that the most important group of
banks among the "makers" of the Eurocurrèncy market will con-
tinue to have a strong preference for dollars. However, it has been
suggested that the announced phaseout of U.S. capital controls will
12. So long as central banks intervene in the exchange market to influence the
value of their currencies, a regime in which allmajorcurrencies are floating is
virtually impossible.There will be a tendency for central banks to control the
exchange value of their currency in terms of the leading international currency.
Since this currency serves as the international standard of value, it cannot float
in the sense that its value changes proportionately in relation to all other curren-
cies simultaneously. This situation has been referred to as the n-i problem.If
there are ncurrencies,there can be only n-i exchange rates expressed in terms
of the standard of value. While the dollar is the standard, the only way that the
value of the dollar can be changed by a uniform percentage in terms of all other
currencies is for the value of all other currencies simultaneously to change by a
like percentage in terms of the dollar. This requires an international agreement
such as was negotiated in December 1971, ana again in February 1973, since a
uniform change in the value of all nondollar currencies in terms of the standard
would almost certainly not occur as a consequence of the actions of individual
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mean a reduction in the operations of branches of U.S.
banks.13 Nevertheless, we are inclined to believe that the penetra-
tion of the U.S. banking industry abroad, like that of U.S.-based
multinational firms, is likely to remain and to grow in significance.
A third factor explaining the past position of the dollar in both
the Eurocurrency and Eurobond markets is the relationship of these
Euromarkets to the large U.S. financial market. To reemphasize
a basic point, the Eurocurrency markets are markets for transactions
in the currencies of different countries; Eurocurrencies are not sim-
ply units of account. The same is true of a Eurobond which calls
for payment of interest and principal in dollars or in some other
international currency. Eurocurrency and Eurobond operations not
only involve real transfers of the currencies in which they are de-
nominated, but large flows of funds into and out of a particular
Eurocurrency market will have an impact on the domestic money
market of the country whose currency is involved.
At the middle of 1972, the estimated net size of the Eurocurrency
market (the BIS definition) was $85 billion, of which the Euro-
dollar component was $65 billion.'4 The former figure is six times
the total value of Swiss franc currency and demand deposits and
nearly two and one-half times the total volume of German currency
and demand deposits. If the bulk of the Eurocurrency market took
the form of Euro-Deutsche marks and Euro-Swiss francs—which
account for over 80 percent of Eurocurrency liabilities other than
Eurodollars—large movements of funds into and out of the Euro-
currency market could have very disturbing impacts on the domestic
monetary systems of these countries, so much so that their mone-
tary authorities might take action to prevent the use of their cur-
rencies for this purpose. On the other hand, large movements in
and out of Eurodollars would scarcely have a noticeable impact on
the U.S. money market. Moreover, the predominant position of
U.S. banks in the Eurodollar market assures that a dollar "crunch"
could only be of temporary duration, since the U.S. parent banks
13. See Hugh Stephenson, "Shadow Over Banks in London: American Phaseout
of Curbs May Hurt," New York Times, February 25, 1973.
14. Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York, World Financial Markets,
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could quickly provide an ample volume of dollars.'5The large
dollar holdings of foreign official institutions also provide a poten-
tial source of support for the Eurodollar
Implications for International Monetary Reform
At the time of writing (April 1973), negotiations are being initiated
by the Committee of Twenty'7 on the reform of the international
monetary system.Despite important differences among the IMF
members, the addresses of the finance ministers of the major coun-
tries at the Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors of the IMF
in September 1972, including that of the U.S. Secretary of the
Treasury, revealed a general desire to move toward a more sym-
metrical role of the dollar in relation to other currencies.In his
address to the Board of Governors, Secretary of the Treasury
Shultz1outlined in broad terms a proposal for international mone-
tary reform that would (a) reduce the role of the dollar as a reserve
currency but not eliminate that role; (b) give the dollar the same
technical possibilities for exchange-rate flexibility as other curren-
cies; (c) impose on surplus countries a responsibility for balance-
of-payments adjustment equivalent to that of the deficit countries;
and (d) establish changes in holdings of official reserves by individ-
ual countries as the principal criterion for determining the obliga-
tions of both surplus and deficit countries to take balance-of-pay-
ments adjustment measures. A full examination of the issues raised
15. The Eurodollar market has been characterized from time to time by a
temporary shortage of dollar funds which has resulted in a very sharp rise in
interest rates on day-to-day funds.
16. During 1968 and 1969 when U.S. banks were borrowing heavily from the
Eurodollar market, both the BIS (by drawing on its swap agreement with the
United States) and European central banks intervened from time to time in the
Eurodollar market to relieve the pressure on interest rates arising from heavy
demands for Eurodollar funds. See, for example, Charles A. Coombs, "Treasury
and Federal Reserve Foreign Exchange Operations," Monthly Review, Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, March 1969, pp. 43—56.
17. Established at the Annual Meetings of the Board of Governors of the IMF,
September 1972.
18. "Statement by George P. Shultz, Secretary of the Treasury and Governor
of the Fund and Bank for the United States, at the Joint Annual Discussion,"
Board of Governors 1972 Annual Meetings, Washington, D.C., Press Release No.
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by these proposals and of alternative proposals put forward by the
representatives of other IMF members at the September 1972 An-
nual Meeting would take us far afield.Therefore, our discussion
will be limited to the implications of our analysis of foreign dollar
balances for certain aspects of the international monetary reform
proposals.
THE COMPOSITION OF OFFICIAL RESERVES
If the dollar is to have a reduced role in the total volume of offi-
cial reserves, consideration must be given to the disposition of the
large accumulated holdings of official American dollar balances,
which totaled over $61 billion at the end of December 1972, and
which rose to over $70 billion by mid-March 1973.19 Foreign offi-
cial holdings of American dollar balances plus official holdings of
Eurodollars (the latter being estimated at $15—$20 billion at the
end of 1972)20 constituted about half of all foreign official reserves
as of December 1972.21 Our earlier analysis suggests that even
with the restoration of confidence in the exchange value of the
dollar, a substantial portion of the official holdings of American
dollars is not likely to be shifted to foreign private holders.In-
creases in foreign private liquid dollar holdings are likely to take
the form of Eurodollars rather than American liquid dollar assets.
Some return flow of U.S. resident capital that moved into foreign
currencies during 1970, 1971, and 1972 might be expected; but
even if the total amount of this flow, as indicated by the errors and
omissions item in the U.S. international accounts over the years
1970—72, were to return to the United States, this would take no
more than $16 billion of the official dollar holdings.If we assume
that this amount of short-term funds held by U.S. residents abroad
returned to the United States, and if, in addition, we assume that
another $10 billion were more or less permanently held by foreign
official institutions as working balances, this would still leave a
balance of some $35 billion in foreign official holdings of American
19. Federal Reserve Bulletin, March 1973, p. A78, Table 6.
20. Based on an estimate of $25—$30 billion for total Eurocurrency holdings
of foreign official institutions given in World Financial Markets, Morgan Guar-
anty Trust Company of New York, March 22, 1973, p. 6.
21. international Financial Statistics, April 1973, p. 19.Implications for Reform 105
dollars, plus whatever net accumulation takes place after December
1972.22
Thefact that foreign central banks hold a portion of their official
reserves in the form of Eurocurrency deposits also raises problems
for the composition and volume of the world's official reserves. One
of the purposes of the SDR facility created in 1969 (and a major
objective of virtually all current proposals for international mone-
tary reform) is the achievement of international control over the
volume of official reserves. The redepositing of official reserves in
Eurocurrency banks makes for instability in the volume of official
reserves.23 Such redepositing may also be employed to conceal the
volume of these reserves.24 This practice would interfere with an
internationally supervised balance-of-payments adjustment mecha-
nism based on changes in the level of each country's official reserves,
such as that envisaged by the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury in the
reform proposals noted above.
Regarding the Eurocurrency element in official reserve holdings,
the suggestion has been made that central banks should agree not
to hold Eurocurrencies. As has been mentioned earlier, in the spring
of 1971, the central banks of the Group of Ten entered into an
agreement not to increase their Eurocurrency holdings. While an
agreement not to hold Eurocurrencies might be reached by the cen-
tral banks of the major industrial countries, a large portion of the
Eurocurrency holdings of foreign central banks is held by central
banks in countries outside Western Europe. At the end of 1971,
22. In the first quarter of 1973, the United States had an official settlements
deficit roughly estimated at $10.5 billion, seasonally adjusted.(World Financial
Markets, Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York, April 24, 1973, p. 5.)
A substantial portion of this deficit was probably caused by the outflow of U.S.
resident capital, and most of this capital is likely to return with the advent of
foreign-exchange stability.
23. As has been explained in Chapter 3, the depositing of reserve currencies in
Eurocurrency banks tends to increase the total volume of the world's official re-
serves.Moreover, they can be quickly liquidated; and under a system of con-
vertible currencies, the actual currencies could be presented to the monetary au-
thorities for conversion into reserve assets such as gold or SDRs.
24. For example, at the end of October 1972, Japan reported official reserves
of $17.8 billion. However, it has been disclosed that at that time, the Japanese
government held $1.8 billion in deposits with foreign commercial banks, $2.5
billion in deposits with Japanese commercial banks, and $900 million in medium-
and long-term foreign bonds, none of which was included in the reported holdings
of official reserves. (Wall Street Journal, November 1, 1972, p. 6)106 Summary and Conclusions
nearly two-thirds of the $10 billion of (identified) Eurodollar hold-
ings of central banks were held by central banks outside the ten
major industrial countries.25 (This is probably a considerable under-
estimate, since, as noted in Chapter 2, there is in existence a sub-
stantial sum of 'unidentified Eurocurrency holdings of official in-
stitutions.) At the end of 1972, total central bank and government
holdings of Eurocurrencies were estimated to be between $25 and
$30 billion,20 the bulk of which is believed to be held outside West-
ern Europe.27It would be difficult, if not impossible, to convince
most countries that they should hold their official reserves in SDRs
or other assets yielding a low return or none at all.It is our view
that Eurocurrencies are likely to become increasingly important as
official reserve assets, and we see little likelihood of this trend being
reversed.
DOLLAR CONVERTIBILITY AND OFFICIAL DOLLAR HOLDINGS
Most governments, including the United States, seem to envisage
an eventual restoration of the convertibility of the dollar (and of
other major currencies as well) into a noncurrency reserve asset,
probably SDRs. Dollar convertibility will, of course, require an
effective balance-of-payments adjustment mechanism plus adequate
U.S. reserves to deal with temporary drains: In addition,, it is gen-
erally believed that some disposition must be made of the large
official holdings of American dollars as a condition for restoring
and maintaining the convertibility of the dollar. There are several
proposals for dealing with these official dollar holdings, none of
which is entirely satisfactory to all concerned. For example, these
holdings could be funded into long-term U.S. obligations with an
SDR-value guarantee, or they could be exchanged at the IMF for
SDRs or special IMF deposits. In either case, the tendering of the
official dollar assets (or other reserve currencies) could be made
compulsory or optional for the holders. However, it appears un-
likely that the U.S. government would favor a compulsory arrange-
25. IMF Annual Report 1972, Washington, D.C., p. 30.
26. World Financial Markets, Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York,
March 22, 1973, p. 6.
27. An increasing amount of the foreign-exchange earnings of the governments
of the Middle East petroleum-producing countries is believed to be flowing into
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ment in the light of its stated position that the dollar should con-
tinue to serve as an official reserve medium. Moreover, some coun-
tries might want to maintain the existing level of their reserves, while
others would prefer to exchange all of, or a portion of, their reserve
currency holdings for long-term bonds with an SDR-value guar-
antee. One proposal is that foreign central banks be given an op-
tion of exchanging their dollars for SDRs by a specified date, after
which time their dollar holdings would be ineligible for such con-
version. However, an arrangement of this sort is likely to create
difficulties, especially if foreign countries elect to retain a large
proportion of their official dollars.28 For one thing, the availability
of these official dollars for payments to the United States would
mean that this country could not earn reserve assets when it had a
surplus. Also, a country electing to hold its reserves in dollars might
sell the dollars to buy a third currency, with the dollars flowing into
other central banks. Would these dollars be convertible into SDRs,
or would there be two kinds of foreign-held dollars, one convertible
and the other inconvertible? A similar problem would arise if the
country electing to hold dollars decided to place a portion of them
in the Eurodollar market, in which case the dollars might flow into
other central banks.If these dollars were convertible, the central
banks acquiring them might .present them for redemption to the
U.S. Treasury. This could occur even when the United States was
in equilibrium on basic balance account.
Even though Eurodollars are not obligations of the United States,
developments in the Eurodollar market could cause a temporary
drain, or threat of a drain, on U.S. reserves. A clear case would be
the withdrawal by foreign central banks of a portion of the $10 to
$15 billion in official Eurodollar deposits currently held and the
presentation of these dollars to the U.S. Treasury for redemption
in SDRs. Let us assume that a foreign central bank withdraws a
billion dollars in deposits from foreign branches of U.S. banks. The
immediate effect would be a transfer of American dollars to the
28. Many countries are likely to find American dollar assets or Eurodollars
more attractive than SDRs as reserve assets. The interest yield on SDRs is likely
to be much less than that on liquid dollar assets and, in addition, some countries
may feel that dollars or other reserve currencies entail less risk than credits on
the books of the IMF—credits which have value only so long as IMF members
are willing to provide their own currencies against such credits.108 Summary and Conclusions
foreign central bank. This action would tend to reduce Eurodollar
lending by the U.S. foreign branches (or by the Eurobanking sys-
tem as a whole). An equivalent amount of American dollars would,
in turn, be received by the U.S. foreign branches as net Eurodollar
lending declined. Some, not necessarily all, of the dollars represent-
ing net loan repayments to the U.S. branch banks might come from
foreign central banks. Some of the dollar repayments might come
from U.S. residents if foreign affiliates of U.S. corporations were
forced to curtail their borrowing from the Eurodollar market. An
increase in Eurodollar deposit rates might attract additional deposits
from other central banks, unless there was an expectation of a de-
preciation in the value of the dollar. The rise in interest rates would
also attract funds from the United States. Much the same chain of
events would occur if the foreign central banks withdrew Eurodollar
deposits from foreign commercial banks instead of U.S. foreign
branches. The foreign commercial banks would either draw down
their balances held in the United States or, perhaps more likely,
would reduce their Eurodollar deposits with foreign branches of
U.S. banks. In either case, there would be a transfer of American
dollars to foreign central banks and, thus, an addition to official
holdings eligible for conversion.
Developments along the foregoing lines could be set off if ex-
pectations of some future U.S. devaluation were to trigger a mas-
sive reduction of Eurodollar deposits, both private and official. The
immediate effect would be a flow of American dollars to foreign
central banks.Again, as Eurodollar lending was curtailed, there
would be a reflux of dollars to the foreign branches of U.S. banks,
part of which would come from the foreign central banks as foreign
borrowers converted their domestic currencies into dollars to make
repayments. During 1971, when there was a substantial decline in
foreign nonbank Eurodollar deposits, it was offset in part by a rise
in foreign official deposits, in part by dollars acquired by foreign
commercial banks through swap arrangements with central banks,
and in part by a flow of U.S. dollars to the market. The first two
sources might not be readily available if foreign central banks had
the option of acquiring other reserve assets from the United States.
The third source would simply add to the flow of dollars to foreign
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It should be emphasized that these are short-term drains that
would be reversed as long as there was no long-run shift in the total
foreign demand for American liquid dollar assets, or a substantial
outflow of U.S. private funds to the Eurodollar market. Basically,
what would be involved is a short-term capital flow from the U.S.
parent banks to deal with a liquidity crisis in the Eurodollar market.
Nevertheless, in view of the huge volume of Eurodollar claims, such
flows could be quite sizable. The possible magnitude of these flows
is difficult to estimate, but they could amount to many billions of
dollars, quite apart from short-term capital exports by U.S. non-
banking residents to the Eurodollar market.
Clearly, contingencies like those discussed in the preceding para-
graphs 'would need to be taken into account in determining the level
of U.S. reserves compatible with the convertibility of the dollar into
SDRs, and in defining the extent of such convertibility with respect
.t'o accumulated balances. In the latter regard, a possible compro-
mise solution would be to set some minimum percentage, adjusted
to the circumstances of each country, for the amount of its official
dollar claims (whether held directly or as Eurodollars) to be con-
verted into long-term obligations.
THE ROLE OF THE DOLLAR AS AN INTERVENTION CURRENCY
Another key issue in any international monetary reform pro-
gram concerns the role of the dollar as an intervention currency.
Throughout the postwar period, the dollar has had no rival for the
intervention function.Following the Smithsonian Accord of De-
cember 18, 1971, most major industrial countries adopted "cen-
tral rates" expressed in terms of the U.S. dollar, and agreed to
maintain their exchange rates within a margin of 2¼ percent above
and below the central rate for their currency registered with the
IMF, giving a total spread of 4½ percent in relation to the dollar.
Other countries, including France and the United Kingdom, main-
tained their existing par values with the Fund, while others adopted
new par values.This system of par values, or central rates, was
weakened somewhat by the British decision to float the pound ster-
ling in June 1972, and the system collapsed in February and March
of 1973. The second devaluation of the dollar, by approximately110 Summaryand Conclusions
10 percent, was announced on February 19, 1973, together with
the floating of the Japanese yen.Intense speculation against the
dollar and certain other currencies led to the initiation in March
1973 of a joint float among the currencies of the following EC coun-
tries: Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg,
and Denmark; they were later joined in the float by the non-EC
countries of Sweden, Norway, and Finland. The currencies of the
other EC countries—the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Italy—
floated independently of the EC float but were expected to become
stabilized in relation to the other EC currencies at some time in
the future. The joint float involves the maintenance of exchange
rates among the EC currencies within a maximum margin of 2¼
percent, but there is no fixed trading relationship with respect to
the dollar. The EC currencies in the joint float are maintained
within the 2¼ percent band in relation to each other by means of
intervention conducted in those currencies, while intervention in
dollars apparently takes place unilaterally, with the central bank
of each country influencing the relationship of its currency, and
hence that of the entire group, to the dollar.
Should the EC joint float, enlarged eventually by the pound
sterling and the Italian lira and perhaps other currencies, prove
successful and enduring, another currency—possibly the Deutsche
mark—will share the intervention role with the dollar.In time,
there may be developed a common EC monetary unit which is con-
vertible at a fixed rate into each EC currency, and which will be
traded on the international currency markets.
At the present time, both international financial instability and
the serious negotiations being conducted by the Committee of
Twenty for the reconstitution of the international monetary system
make it difficult, and perhaps foolhardy, to predict the future of the
dollar as an intervention currency and international standard of
value.Nevertheless, we believe it would be unwise to write off
these functions of the dollar for the future, at least until another
currency emerges with the prerequisites for performing them. These
prerequisites explain the dominant international role of the dollar
over the past several decades, namely, a large stake in world trade,
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obligations denominated in the national currency. Perhaps only a
common EC monetary unit such as that described above could meet
these qualifications. The fact that a currency is strong does not
necessarily make it a good candidate for the standard of value and
intervention role. In fact, a very strong currency is quite likely to
appreciate vis-à-vis all other currencies and, hence, would be un-
acceptable to international debtors.29 Conversely, a very weak cur-
rency becomes unacceptable to international creditors.
It is quite possible that the partial floating rate system in effect
since February 1973 might continue with the dollar serving as the
principal intervention currency. Under this system, major foreign
countries are intervening in the foreign-exchange market to control
the dollar value of their currencies but at the same time are avoid-
ing any substantial additional accumulation of American dollars.
This may well prove to be the most feasible means of achieving and
maintaining a pattern of exchange rates consistent with general
balance-of-payments equilibrium. However, the fact that virtually
all IMF members favor a return to some form of par value system
in which currency parities are expressed in terms of the SDR3° sug-
gests that in time the world may abandon the present floating rate
system and adopt a par value system based on the SDR. But the
SDR in its present form cannot be privately held or traded in the
exchange markets against national currencies, nor does it seem
likely that such an SDR will be devised. Consequently, the SDR
cannot serve as an intervention currency. Moreover, a par value
system based on the SDR cannot be established until an interven-
tion currency exists which is stable in terms of the SDR and con-
vertible into it. The fact that the dollar is formally defined in terms
of the SDR but is not convertible into it means that the conditions
for an enduring par value system are not met.
29. The European Payments Union was established in 1950 precisely because
the dollar was too strong to serve as the intervention currency for freely con-
vertible European currencies. De facto convertibility among the European cur-
rencies was achieved via the Clearing Union.
30. Nearly all of the statements made by the Governors of the IMF at the
Board of Governors 1972 Annual Meeting favored a par value system based on
the SDR. Only France among the major industrial countries favored defining
parities in terms of gold and the establishment of an international gold standard
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The above analysis suggests that if the dollar i•s to perform twin
roles of intervention currency and de facto standard of value in
a future par value system, there must be a restoration of confidence
in the stability of the dollar in terms of the de jure standard, the SDR,
and this would seem to require convertibility of the dollar into
SDRs. Furthermore, the U.S. objective of providing full symmetry
between the dollar and other major currencies so that the dollar has
the same degree of exchange flexibility as other currencies, even to
the extent of enabling the dollar temporarily to float freely on the
exchange markets, would appear to be incompatible with the inter-
vention role.31While under a new international monetary system
there may occur changes in the value of the dollar in terms of the
SDR, such changes must necessarily be infrequent as compared with
parity changes of other currencies. Frequent changes in the value of
the dollar in terms of the SDR might well lead to chaotic conditions
in the exchange market, since a large number of countries would
tend to follow the dollar while others would maintain their cur-
rency parities in terms of SDRs, thereby changing the entire pattern
of cross rates.If and when the EC countries are able to evolve a
common monetary unit, and this unit gains prominence both as a
transactions medium and an intervention currency among a large
number of countries, the principal focus in a decision to change the
value of the. dollar in terms of SDRs would, in effect, be a change in
the relationship between the dollar and the EC monetary unit, with
most of the currencies of the rest of the world lining up with one or
the other of the two de facto standards.
The problems sketched above have important implications for
exchange-rate adjustments, which are expected to play a far more
important role in balance-of-payments adjustments in the future
than in the past. While we do not regard these problems as insolu-
ble, outlining possible solutions, such as a system of multiple cur-
rency intervention or a system under which the IMF would regulate
31. For example, if the United States wanted the dollar to float freely tem-
porarily, it could do so only if all the major industrial countries would agree not
to employ the dollar as an intervention currency, i.e., not to buy or sell dollars
against their own currencies in the exchange market. Exchange between
nondollar currencies would need to be maintained within the prescribed limits
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currencyparities in order to maintain effective exchange rates,32 is
beyond the terms of reference of this study.
32. The effective exchange rate is the weighted composite value of all other
currencies in terms of a country's currency.Practically, it has significance only
in terms of a percentage change in the effective rate from one period to another.
For an excellent discussion of the proposal for achieving exchange-rate adjust-
ments by means of altering effective rates—thereby solving the problem of chang-
ing the value of the currency that serves as the intervention currency—see Henry
C. Wallich, The Monetary Crisis of 1971—The LessOns to Be Learned (Per Jacobs-
son Foundation Lecture, September 14, 1972), Washington, D.C.: International
Monetary Fund, 1972.